SOURCE-LINKED INTELLIGENCE
Learning Principal-Agent Contracts for Equitable Smallholder Carbon Farming under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Agricultural soils are a major untapped carbon sink. Carbon farming is emerging as a promising practice for tapping this potential. Smallholder farmers, who dominate agriculture across South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, are key to scaling climate mitigation via carbon farming. It is ironic that real-world carbon programs largely fail to reach them. We study this important gap through the lens of contract design. An aggregator offers a single pooled contract to a heterogeneous population of smallholder farmers who have private adoption costs (adverse selection) and exert unobserved effort (mora
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Evidence & attribution
- arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · 2026-09-17T13:53:00.000Z
First collected: 2026-09-19T20:28:14.107Z. This is not the publication date.