SOURCE-LINKED INTELLIGENCE
Robust PAC Learning of Concurrent Stochastic Games
We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framewo
Read original source ↗ Open in workspace
- recordType
- paper
- region
- Global
Evidence & attribution
- arXiv · AI, language, vision and robotics · 2026-09-03T17:58:57.000Z
First collected: 2026-09-21T04:31:57.454Z. This is not the publication date.